Introduction

Between 2014 and 2015, an estimated 40,000 foreign fighters from over 100 countries joined the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria. This article delves into the entry points and methods used by these fighters, with a particular focus on the role of Turkey and other countries in facilitating their illegal entry. The key to understanding these dynamics lies in deconstructing the geopolitical ambitions and actions that fueled the recruitment and entry of foreign fighters into Syria.

The Role of Turkey in Facilitating ISIS Recruitment

The majority of the 40,000 foreign fighters who joined ISIS entered through Turkey, a country that simultaneously sponsored and regulated their passage. This practice was not purely altruistic; Turkey had specific geopolitical and strategic objectives in mind.

Turkish Border Management and ISIS

During the early years of the Syrian conflict, border crossings between Turkey and Syria were relatively porous. The Turkish government, particularly the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, played a crucial role in managing these borders. According to Abu Mansour al-Maghrebi, an official who oversaw the reception of foreign fighters, the Turkish border with Syria was a primary entry point for these fighters. As the “Ambassador” to Turkey for the Islamic State, Abu Mansour explained his role in overseeing the reception of foreign fighters at Tal Abyad, Aleppo, and Idlib. He detailed that approximately 35,000 foreign fighters entered through these areas during the peak years of 2014 and 2015. While numbers declined in subsequent years, the legacy of these actions remains significant.

Geopolitical Ambitions and Terrorist Recruitment

Behind the scenes, Turkey’s motivations for supporting and initially permitting the entry of foreign fighters to ISIS were complex. These motivations were rooted in two primary factors:

Syrian Kurdish Independence

The first objective was to suppress Kurdish independence and autonomy movements in Syria. The Turkish government, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, sought to curb the growing power of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Syria. Erdogan viewed the KRG as a threat to Turkey’s security, as the KRG had been involved in the PYD (Democratic Union Party), which was considered a terrorist organization by Turkey. By exacerbating tensions between the KRG and the Assad regime, Turkey aimed to weaken the Kurds and disrupt their efforts to achieve autonomy.

Leveraging ISIS for Geopolitical Gain

The second objective was more ambitious: to annex the northern parts of Syria and Iraq to Turkey, with ISIS serving as a strategic tool. Erdogan's vision of restoring the Ottoman Empire's historical borders included northern Syria and Iraq. By allowing ISIS to recruit and enter Syria, Turkey endowed the group with a potential army that could be used to achieve these geopolitical aspirations.

Non-Financial Support

While it may seem contradictory for a NATO member to support a terrorist organization, it was a matter of diplomatic cunning for Turkey. Abu Mansour al-Maghrebi, in an interview with the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, explained that no financial transactions took place between Turkey and ISIS. Instead, the relationship was one of coordination and diplomacy. According to Abu Mansour, Turkey’s benefit was to control its borders and extend its influence into Northern Syria. He stated, 'Actually, they wanted all the north from Kessab to Mosul, in northern Iraq. This was the vision of Turkey.'

Conclusion

The story of the 40,000 foreign fighters who joined ISIS in Syria is one of geopolitical maneuvering, strategic missteps, and tragic human involvement. Turkey's actions were driven by complex geopolitical ambitions and the desire to exert control over its neighbors. As the conflict continues to evolve, the impact of these actions remains a critical factor in understanding the Syrian refugee crisis, the trajectory of ISIS, and the broader Middle East regional dynamics.